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ABSTRACT
The United Nations ("UN") Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Good ("CISG") offers the promise of
harmonizing international sales law and facilitating international
trade and global commerce. But there is a "homeward trend bias"
that may encourage domestic courts to construe the gaps in the
CISG broadly and fill them with non-uniform domestic legal rules.
Questions about contract interpretation under the CISG raise the
same concerns about a homeward trend bias as questions about the
interpretation of express CISG provisions. The CISG has express
provisions governing contract interpretation but their application
may not provide an unambiguous interpretation. This presents two
risks. One is that courts might reinterpret questions to be about the
validity of contracts rather than their interpretation; in that case the
CISG will not apply and courts will therefore apply domestic legal
rules to answer the questions. The other possibility is that courts
might rule that the interpretive questions are not governed by the
CISG and might therefore use private choice of law rules to identify
domestic legal rules to answer the questions. Neither of these
possibilities should be welcomed. Courts that use non-uniform
domestic laws to answer questions about the interpretation of CISG
contracts will undermine the intent and purpose of the CISG no less
than courts that answer other questions about matters that should be
governed by the CISG using non-uniform domestic laws. All
questions about contract interpretation under CISG contracts should
therefore be governed either by the CISG's explicit provisions or by
the CISG's general principles. This essay provides an analysis of
the CISG's express contract interpretation provisions and illustrates
how they can result in ambiguities. It argues that when there are
ambiguities, the general principles on which the CISG is based
imply that courts should interpret the contracts to promote
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations ("UN") Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Good ("CISG" or "the Convention") offers the
promise of harmonizing international sales law and facilitating
international trade and global commerce. But it is a promise that
appears elusive because of a "homeward trend bias" that may encourage
domestic courts to construe the gaps in the CISG broadly and fill them
with non-uniform domestic legal rules. Scholars have not surprisingly,
therefore, devoted considerable thought to the appropriate interpretation
[Vol. 25:1
2016] STANDARDS FOR CONTRA CTINTERPRETATION 3
of the CISG's provisions and principles. They have, however, devoted
considerably less thought to a closely related problem: how to interpret
the terms of a contract to which the CISG applies. Questions about
contract interpretation under the CISG raise some of the same problems
as questions about the interpretation of express CISG provisions.
Courts that use non-uniform domestic laws to answer interpretive
questions under CISG contracts will undermine the intent and purpose
of the CISG no less than courts that answer other questions about
matters that should be governed by the CISG using non-uniform
domestic laws.
This essay offers an analysis of contract interpretation under the
CISG and argues that all questions about contract interpretation under
CISG contracts should be governed either by the CISG's explicit
provisions or by the CISG's general principles. The CISG thus should
have a broad preclusive effect on domestic legal rules of contract
interpretation. Since the CISG's express provisions governing contract
interpretation create some significant ambiguities, this will place a
considerable burden on the CISG's general principles in interpreting
ambiguous contract terms. This essay argues, however, that the CISG's
general principles and are robust enough to bear that burden and, in fact,
imply that when the CISG's express provisions result in ambiguities
courts should interpret ambiguous contract terms to promote
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Thus,
the CISG's general principles imply standards for contract interpretation
that are similar to the commercial standards for contract interpretation
that are typically applied in most well-developed domestic legal
systems. Nonetheless, it is important for the coherence and unification
of international sales law that the rules of contract interpretation be
developed and applied under the CISG and not under non-uniform
domestic legal systems.
The next section of this essay provides some background on the
CISG. Section III analyzes the CISG's express rules governing contract
interpretation and explains how they may create important and
confounding ambiguities. It also analyzes the general principles
governing contract interpretation under the CISG, and argues that, if the
application of the CISG's express rules results in ambiguities, the
CISG's general principles require ambiguous contract terms to be
interpreted in a manner that promotes reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade. The last section summarizes and offers
some concluding comments.
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II. THE CISG
The CISG is the most important body of law governing
international sales. As of December 15, 2015, it has been adopted by 84
nation states, including the United States and most of the world's major
trading nations.1  In the United States, the CISG applies to most
international sales transactions with the full force of federal law
2
whenever a court determines that United States law applies to a contract
for the sale of non-household 3 goods between parties with places of
business in different "Contracting States," meaning nation states that
have adopted the CISG.4 The CISG was the product of negotiations
between representatives from many nations with diverse legal systems
and traditions, not to mention different languages. 5  Since it was
difficult for the representatives to make compromises on some issues,
they chose to leave some important gaps in the CISG rather than fail to
agree on a final draft.6 Moreover, because they needed to reach
compromises in all six working languages of the United Nations, in
some cases the CISG's provisions can seem particularly terse. As a
consequence, the CISG's rules are quite spare by comparison to the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") or other nations' domestic sales
laws and it generally does not use the same commercial law terms.
7
1 See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "CISG"], available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html. The United States Senate ratified the CISG in
1986 giving it the force of federal law when the Convention came into effect on January 1, 1988.
See CISG: Table of Contracting States, PACE L. SCH. INST. OF INT'L COM. L. (Jan. 8, 2016),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html.
2 Since the CISG has the force of federal law, under the 'Supremacy Clause' of the United
States Constitution, it trumps any conflicting state laws. Thus, when the CISG applies to a
contract, it displaces the UCC.
3 CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(a) (essentially exempts "goods bought for personal, family or
household use"); see also supra art. 2(a)-(f) (exempts goods bought by auction, or by authority of
law, as well as stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments, money, ships,
vessels, hovercraft or electricity).
4 Id. arts. 1(a), 2(a) (in some Contracting States the CISG might apply even if the parties do
not have places of business in different Contracting States); see also id. art. 1(b) (the United
States has declared a reservation to CISG art. l(b) - however, under CISG art. 95, art. l(b) does
not apply within the United States). But see id. art. 6 (CISG allows parties to contract around its
own rules in favor of others).
5 For an overview of the drafting process, see JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 3-10 (4th ed. 2009).
6 See, e.g., CISG arts. 2, 4-5 (these exclude from the scope of the CISG most contracts for
consumer goods, as well as any legal claims relating to the validity of the contracts or contact
terms, and any legal claims related to death from personal injury).
7 For example, the English version of the CISG does not make any reference to "usage of
trade," "warranty," or "consequential damages," even though such terms are commonly used in
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The spare structure of the CISG's rules and its unfamiliar terms
inevitably raise questions of interpretation. What should courts do
when they face questions that the CISG's express provisions do not
explicitly answer, at least in terms with which they are familiar? The
1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties does not apply, since it
is concerned only with the interpretation of treaty obligations of nation
states and the CISG creates obligations between private parties.8 The
CISG itself, however, offers some guidance: Under Article 7(1) courts
are directed to interpret the CISG's provisions in a manner that
promotes uniformity in its application and good faith in international
trade.9 Article 7(2) indicates that when confronted with an apparent gap
in the CISG's express provisions, courts should first look to the general
principles upon which the CISG is based to determine whether they
answer the question, and, if they do not, they should then select the
domestic laws applicable under private choice of law rules and answer
the question with a domestic legal rule.'
0
Unfortunately, Article 7(2) invites controversy. It encourages
parties to find gaps in the CISG's rules so that they may argue for the
application of domestic laws that work to their advantage." To the
extent that courts are susceptible to these arguments, the scope of the
CISG is narrowed and non-uniform domestic laws displace uniform
international laws in the adjudication of international sales disputes.
The purpose of the CISG is thus undermined.
This is hardly a theoretical problem. In fact, courts' inclinations to
use domestic legal rules rather than the CISG to answer questions
arising under the CISG are so strong and pervasive that the problem is
commonly referred to as the "homeward trend bias."' 12 While it would
English speaking nations.
8 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 103.
9 CSIG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.").
10 Id. art. 7(2) ("Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law.").
11 For discussions, see, e.g., RICHARD FENTIMAN, FOREIGN LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS:
PLEADING, PROOF, AND CHOICE OF LAW 29-30 (1998); OTTO KAHN-FREUN, GENERAL
PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 467 (1976); PETER MACHIN NORTH, ESSAYS IN
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1993); JUHA RATIO, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY
IN EC LAW 114 (Francisco Laporta ed. 2003).
12 There are many references to a homeward trend bias in CISG jurisprudence in the
literature. See, e.g., LARRY DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE, 2-3 (2005); JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
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be a mistake to single out any particular reprobates for individualized
criticism, American courts are certainly not above reproach. In fact, in
several well-known cases American courts have declined to apply
express provisions of the CISG, completely ignored precedents from
foreign jurisdictions interpreting CISG provisions, relied on
interpretations of analogous provisions of the UCC rather than
interpretations of the CISG, or construed CISG provisions in an
unreasonably narrow manner thus leaving wide gaps to be filled using
United States law.
13
The homeward trend bias raises the possibility that questions about
contract interpretation arising under CISG contracts could be answered
using domestic legal rules of contract interpretation. There are two
distinct possibilities. One is that courts might face a dilemma because it
is not clear whether the question is one about the interpretation of the
contract or one about the validity of the contract. If a court considers
the question to be about the validity of the contract rather than its
interpretation, then the CISG will not apply at all and the court will be
obliged to apply a domestic legal rule to answer the question. The other
possibility is that courts might face a dilemma because it is not obvious
that the CISG's express provisions provide an answer to a question of
interpretation. For example, a contract term could be truly ambiguous
either because it is not susceptible to any interpretation under the
CISG's express provisions or because it is susceptible to alternative and
inconsistent interpretations under the CISG's express provisions. In
OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES; Harry M. Fletcher, The Several Texts of the
CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other
Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & COM. 187 (1998); see also Guide
to the CISG Article 7, PACE L. SCH. INST. OF INT. COM. L. (Aug. 29, 2006),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-07.html ("[I]t is especially important to
avoid different constructions of the provisions of this Convention by national courts, each
dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of the country of the forum.").
13 See, e.g., Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993
F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1983) (the Fifth Circuit holds that the parol evidence rule would apply under
the CISG, even though it does not); Schmitz-Werke GMBH & Co. v. Rockland Industries, Inc.,
37 Fed. Apps. 687 (4th Cir. 2002) (the Fourth Circuit states that "Case Law interpreting
provisions of Article 2 of the... [UCC] . . . that are similar to provisions of the CISG can ... be
helpful in interpreting the Convention" even though that contradicts the CISG); Caterpillar, Inc.
v. Usinor Industeel 393 F. Supp. 2d 659 (U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill. 2005) (the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois held that the CISG does not preempt promissory estoppel
claims by downstream buyer under Illinois state law, even though it also held that the
downstream buyer may not make claims under the CISG, and that there is a privity bar by
downstream buyers under Illinois state law); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024
(2d Cir. 1995) (the Second Circuit states that "Case law interpreting analogous provisions of
Article 2 of the ... UCC ... may ... inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG
provisions tracks that of the UCC.").
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2016] STANDARDS FOR CONTRACTINTERPRETATION 7
such a case, a court might consider the interpretive question not to be
governed by the CISG and might therefore use a domestic legal rule to
answer the question.
Neither of these possibilities should be welcomed. The more that
courts rely on domestic legal rules rather than the CISG to answer
international sales questions, the less uniform international sales law
will become, and the more the purpose of international legal
codification will be compromised. The mandate in Article 7(1) to
interpret the CISG to promote uniformity in its application and good
faith in international trade implies that courts should construe the scope
of the CISG as broadly as possible so that it precludes the application of
any domestic legal rules of contract interpretation to CISG contracts,
and that they should also limit the application of domestic legal rules
that void contracts or contract terms.
III. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION UNDER THE CISG
By comparison to United States law, the CISG is exceptionally
liberal about the interpretation of contracts. To begin with, there is, no
statute of frauds requirement, so a written memorial is not necessary to
enforce a CISG contract. Article 11 unequivocally states that a CISG
contract does not need to be "concluded in or evidenced by writing and,
in fact, "may be proved by any means, including witnesses." 14 It is
interesting to observe that the United States could have declared a
reservation to Article 11 under Article 96, much as it declared a
reservation to Article l(1)(b) under Article 95, and thus ensured that a
statute of frauds requirement would continue to apply whenever the
CISG applied under United States law, but it did not.1 5  Moreover,
although some courts have held otherwise, 16 it seems quite clear to most
scholars that the CISG does not justify applying a parol evidence rule or
any other rules limiting the use of extrinsic evidence to prove the terms
of a contract. 17 Article 8(3) states that "due consideration is to be given
to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any
practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages
14 CISG, supra note 1, art. 11.
15 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 183 ("States who were concerned to preserve formality
requirements... were free to do so by making a reservation under Article 96; those that failed to
do so presumably were willing to forego such protections.").
16 See, e.g., Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993
F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1983).
17 See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 164-65; JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE
CISG, 43-44 (3d ed. 2008).
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and any subsequent conduct of the parties."18 This has been interpreted
by most scholars and courts to allow almost any relevant extrinsic
evidence to be used in proving the terms of a CISG contract.' 
9
. Article 9 of the CISG specifically authorizes the use of mercantile
practices and customs in interpreting CISG contracts. Article 9(1) states
that "[t]he parties are bound by ... any practices which they have
established between themselves." 20  In the commercial law terms used
by the UCC, this would justify the use of courses of dealing and courses
of performance. Under the UCC, a course of dealing is a pattern of
conduct between the parties during pervious transactions; a course of
performances is a pattern of conduct between the parties during their
present transaction. Article 9(2) states that the parties "are
considered... to have impliedly made applicable ... a usage of which
they knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is
widely known to... parties of the type involved., 22 In the terms used
by the UCC, this allows usages of trade to be used in contract
interpretation. 23  The CISG thus authorizes mercantile practices and
customs that are essentially like courses of dealing, courses of
performance, and usages of trade as they are understood under the UCC
to be used to interpret CISG contracts, whereas the UCC limits them to,
at most, explaining or supplementing the written terms when a written
memorial of the parties' agreement is executed.24
The CISG's liberal rules have some important implications: First
of all, the CISG accords extrinsic evidence as much weight as written
18 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3).
19 See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 165 (there is now a strong (although not unanimous) line of
precedents in United States courts holding that the parol evidence rule does not apply under the
CISG).
20 CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
21 U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) states that "a course of
performance is a sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular transaction," and § 1 -
303(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) states that "a course of dealing is a
sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions between the parties to a particular
transaction ... ").
22 CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
23 U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIt. LAW COMM'N 2015) ("[A] usage of trade is
any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of occurrence in a place, vocation, or
trade as to justify the expectation that it will be observed ... ").
24 See U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015) ("Terms with respect to
which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or otherwise set forth in a writing
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement may not be contradicted ... but
may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade; and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have
been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.").
[Vol. 25:1
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evidence in the interpretation of contract terms. 25 Moreover, the CISG
has no statute of frauds, and so there is no requirement that there be a
written memorial of the parties' contractual obligations. Even if there is
a written memorial of the agreement there are no restrictions on how
extrinsic evidence may be brought to bear on contract interpretations.
26
This is in contrast to the UCC, which only allows extrinsic evidence at
most to be used to explain or supplement the terms of a written
memorial.27
Second, the CISG allows almost any extrinsic evidence to be used
to prove the terms of a contract. There is no parol evidence rule, and so
oral evidence as well as evidence about courses of dealing, courses of
performance, and usages of trade may all be brought to bear on the
interpretation of a CISG contract. Moreover, unlike the UCC, the CISG
does not specify any hierarchy of authority between the kinds of
evidence that might be used; they all carry the same weight. 28  Thus,
oral evidence and evidence about mercantile practices and customs
carry the same weight as the evidence provided by a written memorial,
and may not only explain or supplement the written evidence but may
also contradict it.
The overarching implication of the CISG's rules is that they create
the potential for considerably more ambiguity about the interpretation of
contract terms than the UCC. It is particularly significant that the
UCC's rules generally limit the admissibility of contradictory evidence,
whereas the CISG's rules do not. Thus, courts are more likely to have
to interpret contract terms using contradictory evidence under the CISG
than they are required to do under the UCC. This has the potential to
make courts' interpretations less predictable and possibly even
inconsistent. The difficult interpretive challenges may also increase
courts' temptation to rely on domestic legal rules to resolve interpretive
problems when the CISG's rules do not appear to provide sufficient
guidance.29 It would be a mistake, however, for courts to succumb to
25 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 164-65.
26 Id.
27 U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
28 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 164-65.
29 Scholars have recognized that this is a serious problem. See, e.g., LOOKOFSKY, supra note
17, at 43 (the author writes, "Although Article 8 clearly governs the (very large) matter of (sales)
contract interpretation, we could hardly expect these few lines of text to serve as a replacement
for the mountain of jurisprudence accumulated elsewhere on this important subject. For this
reason, courts and arbitrators sometimes apply more specific, yet widely accepted principles -
such as contra proferentem - to supplement the black letter law in Article 8; to provide
justification (authority)... they can either divine a CISG general principle.., or they might look
outside the Convention, to lex mercuratoria and the like." The latter course is a great danger to
10 CARDOZO J OF INT'L & COMP. LAW
the temptation. The CISG's express rules and general principles
governing contract interpretation provide sufficient guidance to resolve
almost all interpretive problems in a reasonably predictable and
consistent manner without recourse to domestic legal rules.
A. The CISG's Express Contract Interpretation Provisions
Article 8(1) of the CISG states that statements made by and other
conduct of a party are to be determined by the party's subject intent
where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that
intent was.3" Thus, in MCC Marble,31 where a Florida buyer signed a
written form with terms stated in Italian that he did not understand, and
agents of the Italian seller provided affidavits attesting that he did not
mean to be bound by those terms, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
lower court erred by excluding the affidavits providing evidence of the
buyer's subjective intent.32  The affidavits, together with the buyer's
own testimony, might have been sufficient to prove that the buyer did
not subjectively intend to be bound by the Italian terms, even though the
court was moved to express its incredulity that an experienced business
person could be so reckless about signing a written form in a footnote to
the opinion.33 Unfortunately, Article 8(1) will rarely apply since there
will rarely be evidence that is not only sufficient to prove a party's
subjective intent but is also sufficient to prove that the other party knew
or could not have been unaware of that subjective intent.
Article 8(2) is therefore likely to govern most contract
interpretations under the CISG. Article 8(2) states that where Article
8(1) does not apply, statements made by and other conduct of a party
are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable
person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same
circumstances. 34 What is perhaps most interesting about Article 8(2) is
the uniformity of international sales law and should be discouraged. The main purpose of this
essay is to argue that all questions of contract interpretation under the CISG should be answered
using the CISG and the jurisprudence it spawns and to suggest how that may be done).
30 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1) ("[S]tatements made by and or other conduct of a party
are to be determined by his intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware
what that intent was.").
31 MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino, 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir.
1998).
32 Id. at 1391.
33 Id. at 1387 n.9 ("We find it nothing short of astounding that an individual, purportedly
experienced in commercial matters, would sign a contract in a foreign language and expect not to
be bound simply because he could not comprehend its terms.").
34 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2) ("[S]tatements made by and or other of a party are to be
determined according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other
[Vol. 25:1
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not that it uses a reasonableness standard, but the way it uses a
reasonableness standard - that is, by implying that a party's statements
should be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable
person of the same kind as the other party would have had under the
same circumstances. As the discussion below will elaborate though,
this particular use of a reasonableness standard has the potential to
create some ambiguities.
Article 8(2) appears to imply that if one of the parties drafts a
written memorandum for a contract and there is a dispute about the
interpretation of one of the terms, a court should interpret the term in
the same way that a reasonable person of the same kind (presumably
meaning in the same trade and/or from the same culture) as the other
party would have done under the same circumstances. 35  The
implication appears to be similar to that of the contra proferentem rule
that is commonly used to resolve contract interpretation disputes in the
United States, 36 although it may not disfavor the drafter quite so much
as it favors the reasonableness of the interpretation, and it certainly does
not justify applying the contra proferentem rule from any domestic laws
to a CISG contract. Nonetheless, since contract terms are commonly
drafted by the party with more resources and experience,37 the rule
seems both reasonable and fair. It also obviates the need for a court to
apply the contra proferentem rule under any domestic law. 38
This is not to say, however, that the application of Article 8(2) to
statements made by a single party can never result in ambiguities. It is
significant that Article 8(2) uses the indefinite article in stating the
reasonableness standard for interpreting a party's statements. Perhaps
reasonable people may disagree, and perhaps they might also interpret
the party's statements or conduct in different ways even under the same
circumstances. In other words, there may be more than one
understanding of a party's statement that could be imputed to a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party in the same
circumstances. In such a case, of course, Article 8(2) would not provide
an unambiguous interpretation of the party's statement. As Joseph
party would have had in the same circumstances.").
35 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 252-53.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (exploring the implications of unequal bargaining
power for the contractual writings drafted by the parties).
38 This essay disapproves of the application of contra proferentem unless it is developed and
applied under the authority of the CISG. This has typically not been the case. See, e.g.,
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 17, at 43.
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Lookofsky has suggested,39 it might be tempting for courts to resolve
the ambiguity by appealing to domestic legal rules. Unfortunately, that
would undermine the purpose of the CISG.
Although it may not be obvious, Article 8(2) also applies to
contract interpretations when both of the parties negotiate and draft - or
at least execute-the contract terms in a written memorial of their
agreement. In fact, Article 8(2) appears to imply that courts should
apply the same standard in interpreting contract terms that were jointly
drafted or executed, although they should apply the standard separately
and independently to each of the parties. Thus, each of the parties
should be treated as having made a statement expressing the terms, and
each party's statement of the terms should be interpreted according to
the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other
party would have under the same circumstances. 40  Since an
interpretation of a contract term that can be considered reasonable from
each of the opposing parties' sides can be described as "mutually
reasonable," Article 8(2) appears to direct courts to interpret jointly
drafted contract terms to be mutually reasonable.41
B. Ambiguities Under the CJSG s Express Contract Interpretation
Provisions
Unfortunately, the application of Article 8(2)'s reasonableness
standard may not be as simple as it initially appears.42 If the parties
have a genuine interpretive dispute, it may be possible that, relative to
each of them, a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party
could have an understanding of a written contract term under the same
circumstances that is not only different from their own but also different
from that of a reasonable person in their own position under the same
39 Id.
40 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2) (the language of Article 8(2) refers to "statements ... and
other conduct" of a party. Presumably, a written contract term that is drafted or even simply
executed by a party should be treated as a statement by that party and should, therefore, be subject
to Article 8(2). This was certainly the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit in MCC-Marble
Ceramic Ctr. V. Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino, 144 F.3d 1384 (11 " Cir. 1998)).
41 This should not be surprising. A reasonableness standard is stated in several CISG
provisions. Indeed, one distinguished commentator has claimed that a reasonableness standard is
one of the general principles on which the CISG is based. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM
SALES LAW - THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
38 (1986) ("[T]hat the parties must conduct themselves according to the standard of the
"reasonable person," which is expressly described in a number of provisions and, therefore,
according to Article 7(2), must be regarded as a general principle of the Convention.").
42 The analysis in this part clarifies and extends the analysis in Donald J. Smythe, Clearing
the Clouds on the CISG's Warranty of Title, N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. (forthcoming 2016).
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circumstances. This possibility has been apprehended by at least some
scholars but has not been widely explored and certainly not resolved.43
In fact, since reasonable persons of the same kind can disagree about
their understandings of statements or conduct even under the same
circumstances, it may be possible that, relative to each of the parties, a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party could have had
more than one - perhaps even several - understandings of a contract
term under the same circumstances. 4  In other words, Article 8(2)
might imply a set of multiple understandings (or perhaps to phrase this
more felicitously, "a set of multiple reasonable interpretations") that a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party might have had
under the same circumstances. In fact, since the CISG places no
limitations on the use of extrinsic evidence, the written evidence might
be supplemented by considerable additional extrinsic evidence, some of
which may contradict the written term. As a general matter, therefore,
the CISG's liberal rules about the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
only add to the number of possible understandings (in other words, the
"number of reasonable interpretations") of a contract term that could be
imputed to a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party under
the same circumstances.
The possibility that different and/or multiple reasonable
interpretations of a contract term could be imputed to reasonable
persons of the same kind as the parties under the same circumstances
complicates the application of Article 8(2). Some simple set theory
helps to clarify the issues. Consider a contract dispute between two
43 See, e.g., Gyula Eorsi, General Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 2-18
(Galston & Smit ed., 1984). According to Professor Eorsi, a similar problem was apprehended
during the drafting of the UNIDROIT principles on the validity of contracts. Professor Eorsi
explains that "the two parties to the contract are in different situations and consequently two
"reasonable persons" might well have the same disagreement over the interpretation of the
contract as the parties themselves." In Professor Eorsi's view, this would be a "nightmare" and
might result in a question about the validity of the contract. See also E. Allen Farnsworth, Article
8, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA
SALES CONVENTION 96-7 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds., 1987). The famous contract
scholar Allen Farnsworth also anticipated the problem above, and suggested that it might make
the contract invalid. The view here is obviously that an interpretive conundrum like this one
should be addressed under the CISG as a matter of contract interpretation.
44 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2) (the language of Article 8(2) seems to overlook this
possibility, since it uses the definite article when it refers to "the understanding that a reasonable
person ... would have had in the same circumstances." But it also uses the indefinite article in
referring to "a reasonable person." Since reasonable people can disagree, they could in principle
have different understandings of a contract term under the same circumstances. Thus, in applying
Article 8(2), a court could contemplate the different understandings that different reasonable
persons could have had of a contract term under the same circumstances.).
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parties over the interpretation of a specific contract term. Suppose that,
given all of the available evidence, a set of the reasonable
interpretations of the term that could be imputed to each party is defined
for both parties.45 Article 8(2) implies that the correct interpretation of
the contract term should be one that is "mutually reasonable" - that is, it
should be one that could be imputed to be a reasonable interpretation by
both parties. In other words, it would have to lie in the intersection of
the sets of reasonable interpretations that could be imputed to each of
the parties.
Unfortunately, the matter is more complicated than it might seem.
There are actually three distinct possibilities. 46 The intersection of the
sets of reasonable interpretations defined under Article 8(2) could (1)
identify a unique mutually reasonable interpretation of the term,47 (2)
identify a set of more than one mutually reasonable interpretations of
the term,48 or it (3) might not identify any mutually reasonable
interpretations of the term.49 If Article 8(2) identified a unique mutually
reasonable interpretation, then that arguably would be the one that a
court should apply to the contract term. But what if Article 8(2) did not
identify a unique mutually reasonable interpretation? There are two
ways in which that could happen. First, there might be no mutually
reasonable interpretation at all. In other words, there might not be any
reasonable interpretation that could be imputed to both parties. Second,
there might be more than one mutually reasonable interpretation. In
other words, there might be more than one reasonable interpretation that
could be imputed to both of the parties. In both scenarios, the
application of Article 8(2) would result in ambiguity about the
interpretation of the contract term.
45 The reference to "a set of the reasonable interpretations of the term that could be imputed
to each party" means the set of possible understandings that reasonable persons of the same kind
as the other party could have had under the same circumstances.
46 Readers who are so inclined may like to conceptualize the alternatives in set-theoretic
terms. To that end, let PI denote the set of reasonable interpretations that could be imputed to the
first party, and let P2 denote the set of reasonable interpretations that could be imputed to the
second party.
47 In other words, the intersection of P1 and P2 might consist of a single mutually reasonable
interpretation. This would identify a unique mutually reasonable interpretation of the contract
term.
48 In other words, the intersection of P1 and P2 might consist of more than one mutually
reasonable interpretation. Under the application of Article 8(2), the contract term would thus be
ambiguous.
49 In this case, the intersection of P1 and P2 would consist of the null set - that is, it might not
identify any mutually reasonable interpretations. This is the "nightmare" scenario that Professor
Eorsi discussed in EORSI, supra note 43, at 2-18. Under the application of Article 8(2), the
contract term would also be ambiguous in this case.
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C. Some Examples
1. No Mutually Reasonable Interpretation
Suppose the parties have each signed a written memorandum that
purports to incorporate the seller's standard conditions of sale but does
not attach the conditions to the written memorial and the conditions are
not otherwise transmitted to the buyer in any way. 50 Should the seller's
standard conditions of sale be incorporated into the contract? There is
no easy answer to the question. A reasonable person in the position of
the seller might interpret the contract to incorporate the standard
conditions. A reasonable seller might think that the written memorial
gave the buyer notice of the conditions and that the buyer could have
asked to see them if it had wanted to. A reasonable person in the
position of the buyer might interpret the contract not to incorporate the
conditions. A reasonable buyer might think that the conditions would
only have been incorporated into the contract if the seller had
transmitted the conditions to the buyer in some way before the buyer
signed the writing. It is possible, therefore, under the circumstances,
that there might be no mutually reasonable interpretation of the
contract. 51 In that case, under Article 8(2) alone, the term would remain
ambiguous.
2. Multiple Mutually Reasonable Interpretations
Alternatively, suppose the written memorial of the contract terms
includes a statement that the goods shall be delivered "as soon as
possible., 52  Because the term "as soon as possible" is vague and
probably means different things to different (but reasonable) people
even under the same circumstances, a set of multiple reasonable
interpretations of the term could probably be imputed to each of the
parties. A reasonable person in the position of the seller under the same
circumstances might understand the term to mean anywhere from one
day to a week. A reasonable person in the position of the buyer under
the same circumstances might also understand the term to mean
anywhere from one day to a week. In other words, the set of multiple
50 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 31, 2001 (Ger.),
available in English at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/01 1031 g .html.
51 This is professor Eorsi's "nightmare" scenario. See EORSL, supra note 43, at 2-18.
52 See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court] November 12, 2001 (Ger.),
available at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/0 11112g .html.
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reasonable interpretations of the term that could be imputed to each of
the parties could consist of anytime from one day to one week.
As the example illustrates, the sets of multiple reasonable
interpretations that could be imputed to each of the parties could overlap
significantly so that the term potentially defines multiple mutually
reasonable interpretations of the term. In this example, the multiple
mutually reasonable interpretations of "as soon as possible" would
include every possible delivery time from one day to one week. In
cases such as this where the application of Article 8(2) yields multiple
mutually reasonable interpretations of a contract term, it seems clear
that Article 8(2) alone could not possibly resolve the interpretive
problem. Once again, under Article 8(2) alone the term would remain
ambiguous.
D. Ambiguities Open the Door to the Homeward Trend Bias
It is not immediately obvious how the ambiguities that might result
from the application of Article 8(2) should be resolved. Unfortunately,
the ambiguities open the door to the homeward trend bias that threatens
to undermine the intent and purpose of the CISG.
1. The Validity of the Contract
One possibility, that has been suggested for cases in which there is
no mutually reasonable interpretation of a contract term, such as in the
example about the incorporation by reference of standard contract
terms, is that courts might treat the problem as one that raises a question
about the validity of the contract term (or even the contract itself) rather
than its interpretation.53 This approach might have a superficial appeal
since the apparent nonexistence of a mutually reasonable contract
interpretation may raise a question about whether there was a sufficient
meeting of the minds for a valid contract to have been formed.54 Since
Article 4 makes it clear that the CISG is not concerned with the validity
of the contract, 55 this means that the CISG would not govern the matter
53 See Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An
Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 N.W.J. OF INT'L L. & Bus. 299, 346 (2004).
54 This is the approach, for example, that was taken by a court in France. Cour d'appel [CA]
[regional court of appeal], December 13, 1995 [95-018179] (Fr.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951213fl.html.
55 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4 ("This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of
sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. In
particular, except as otherwise provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with: (a) the
validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage.").
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and an appeal to a domestic legal rule would be required. If United
States law was applied, the doctrines of unconscionability or mistake
might be applied to determine whether the contract term or even the
contract itself was valid.
It is easy to understand why a difficult question about contract
interpretation could be misconstrued as one about the validity of the
contract. Under the common law there is a fine line between questions
about contract interpretation and questions about unconscionability.
56
As Robert Hillman has suggested, an over-reaching interpretation of a
contract term may go hand-in-hand with guile and deception during the
negotiation of the contract, and an unconscionability claim by one party
may be a response to a self-serving and over-reaching contract
interpretation by the other party.57 In fact, a careful reading of the cases
cited in the Official Comments to UCC Section 2-302 to provide
guidance about the application of the unconscionability doctrine reveals
that none of them even mentions the word unconscionability and all of
them can be construed as cases about contract interpretation.58
Nonetheless, while this may make it easy to understand why courts
might be tempted to reframe the question as one about the validity of
the contract, it also suggests that it would probably be inappropriate for
courts to do so.
Courts should exercise extreme caution before deciding to reframe
a question about the interpretation of a contract term as one about the
validity of the contract. As John Honnold explained, the domestic laws
addressing the validity of contracts or contract terms generally fall into
three categories: (1) those that invalidate contract terms because they
have excessively harsh consequences for one of the parties, (2) those
that deny the effect of standard contract terms or forms because they are
used so pervasively that they interfere with the parties' freedom of
contract, or (3) those that deny effect to standard contract terms and
contract forms prepared by one of the parties (although presumably also
executed by the other party) on the ground that the other party may not
have understood the consequences.
59
It is the third category of domestic law that appears relevant to
addressing an ambiguity under the application of Article 8(2). It is
56 For a discussion, see Donald J. Smythe, Consideration for a Price: Using the Contract
Price to Interpret Ambiguous Contract Terms, 34 N. ILL. L. REV. 109, 113-15 (2013).
57 ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 146-52 (Aleksander
Peczenik & Frederick Schauer eds., 1997).
58 Smythe, supra note 56, at 126-32.
59 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 159 (for the sake of the exposition here, the categories have
been renumbered).
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instructive, therefore, that Honnold observes that the first two categories
"do not invade the area of interpretation occupied by Article 8,,6o but he
implies that the third does. 61 It is not difficult to understand why, since
the third category of domestic laws that Honnold refers to is concerned
with the parties' understandings of a contract term, which is central to
its interpretation; since the CISG arguably should govern all questions
of contract interpretation, it should preclude the application of any
domestic legal rules that bear directly or indirectly on contract
interpretation. The implication is that if courts reframe questions about
the interpretation of contract terms as ones about the validity of the
contracts or contract terms simply because the application of Article
8(2) yields an ambiguous interpretation they will allow domestic laws to
invade the domain of the CISG.
2. The Scope of the CISG's Governance of Contract Interpretations
Another possibility, which may be more relevant in cases in which
there are multiple mutually reasonable interpretations of a contract term,
such as a term like "as soon as possible," is that courts might (wrongly)
deduce that because the CISG does not appear to resolve an interpretive
ambiguity, the interpretive question is not governed by the CISG and
they might therefore choose to apply private choice of law rules to
identify the domestic legal rules that should be used to answer the
question. 62  It has been suggested, for example, that in cases where
courts have to decide on the interpretation of an ambiguous contract
term they might simple apply a well-known domestic legal rule such as
contra proferentem to provide an unambiguous interpretation. 63
Ironically, although it is clearly different in some important respects,
Article 8(2) apparently has roots in the contra proferentem rule.64
It is easy to understand how courts might be tempted to apply a
domestic rule of interpretation like contra proferentem that is so widely
used across many domestic legal systems to resolve a difficult
60 Id.
61 Id. at 160.
62 This is one of the possibilities suggested by LOOKOFSKY, supra note 17, at 43; see also
HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 160 (warning of the temptation to apply domestic legal rules to
resolve such an ambiguity; as Honnold observes, "the temptation to incorporate domestic law
approaches under the 'reasonableness' rubric - what could appear more 'reasonable' that what
one is accustomed to under familiar domestic law? - must be recognized and resisted." The
approach taken by the German court in the case that provided the example is not entirely clear).
63 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 17, at 43.
64 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 158.
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interpretive problem. 65 Nonetheless, it would be a mistake. As a matter
of form and substance, courts would better promote the uniformity and
coherence of international sales law by construing the CISG to govern
all questions about contract interpretation. If the CISG governs, then
the application of a domestic legal rule is obviously inappropriate. If
courts begin using domestic legal rules to resolve even only the
thorniest interpretive problems, like the one posed by an ambiguous
term such as "as soon as possible," they may set themselves on a course
to use other domestic legal rules to resolve other interpretive problems.
The habit of falling back on domestic laws might encourage them to
take recourse to more familiar domestic rules even when it is easily
possible to resolve interpretive problems under the CISG.6 6
3. The Challenge
If courts treat questions about contract interpretation under the
CISG as questions about the validity of the contracts, or take recourse to
domestic legal rules of contract interpretation to resolve difficult
interpretive problems, they will undermine decades of efforts to unify
international sales law. 67  Since the CISG clearly governs questions
about contract interpretation, courts should find ways to resolve
interpretive problems under CISG contracts using the CISG and not
domestic legal rules about the validity or interpretation of the contracts.
This is the only way to prevent non-uniform domestic laws from
creeping into international sales law cases. There is no excuse for
treating a question about contract interpretation as if it were one that is
about the validity of the contract or for using domestic legal rules to
answer a question about contract interpretation under the CISG simply
because there is no obvious answer to the interpretive problem. 68 The
challenge, of course, is to find a way to resolve the interpretive
ambiguities arising from the application of Article 8(2) without using
domestic legal rules.
65 Id. at 160.
66 Id.
67 See id. at 3-12. The CISG was the product of almost fifty years of efforts to unify
international sales law. The efforts were initially sponsored by the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and later by the UN Committee on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).
68 See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 160 (the argument here is in accord with the text). But
see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 17, at 23 (arguing that whether a buyer is bound by a contractual
disclaimer of liability is a question about the validity of the contract term that must be addressed
under domestic laws).
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E. Using the CISG's General Principles to Resolve Ambiguities
Article 7(2) provides the hierarchy of authorities for answering
questions in cases governed by the CISG.69 Under Article 7(2) courts
are first supposed to apply the express provisions of the CISG to answer
a question, if any express CISG provisions are applicable; if there are no
applicable express CISG provisions, courts are supposed to look to the
general principles upon which the CISG is based and use those to
answer the question; if neither the express rules of the CISG or the
general principles upon which it is based are availing, then courts are
supposed to apply private choice of law rules, identify the domestic
laws that apply, and use a domestic legal rule to answer the question.
70
Thus, if Article 8 is applied to all the evidence admissible under the
CISG and it does not provide a clear answer to a question about contract
interpretation, then Article 7(2) suggests courts should look to the
general principles upon which the CISG is based to find an answer.
This shifts the focus to identifying the CISG's general principles
governing contract interpretation. Since the most persuasive
scholarship and commentary concurs with the view that the general
principles of the CISG should be "moored to premises that underlie
specific provisions of the Convention," 71 this presents a challenge.
Article 7(1) provides some important guidance. 72  In some
important respects, Article 7(1) states the broadest, most overarching
general principles upon which the CISG is based.73 Article 7(1) directs
courts to interpret the CISG with regard to its international character
and the need to promote uniformity in its application and good faith in
international trade.74 Of course, on its face, Article 7(1) expressly
governs only the interpretation of the CISG's own rules, not any
contract terms that displace or supplement them. Nonetheless, Article
7(1)'s directive to interpret the CISG to promote uniformity in its
69 See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 117.
70 Id.
71 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 146.
72 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be
had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.").
73 See HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 127-30 (implying that Article 7(1) reflects "the very
purpose of the CISG." The author describes Article 7(l)'s directive to interpret the CISG with
regard to its international character, calling this "a most important consideration."); see also
SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 41, at 37 (describing Article 7(l)'s directive to interpret the CISG to
promote good faith in international trade as "one of the general principles that must be regarded
in interpreting and extending uniform law.").
74 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
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application and good faith in international trade reflects underlying
principles of the CISG.7 5 Since Article 7(1) directs courts to resolve
questions concerning matters governed by the CISG by applying the
principles on which it is based when the CISG does not expressly
address the issue, the implication is that courts should interpret parties'
contract terms to promote uniformity in international sales law and good
faith in international trade in cases where Article 8 does not imply a
unique mutually reasonable interpretation. To be more specific, when
Article 8 either suggests multiple mutually reasonable interpretations or
none at all, Article 7(1) directs that courts should interpret the CISG to
resolve the contractual ambiguities in the manner that best promotes
uniformity in the application of the CISG and good faith in international
trade.
Most scholars and commentators appear to agree that courts should
use Article 8 to interpret contract terms under the CISG,76 but there is as
yet very little commentary about whether Article 7(1) specifically
implies principles that courts could use to interpret contract terfis when
their use of the express provisions in Article 8 fails to resolve difficult
interpretive problems. 77 Nonetheless, many commentators have argued
for construing the principles upon which the CISG is based broadly and
some of them have implied that Article 7(1) does imply principles that
can be used in contract interpretation. John Honnold, for example,
emphasizes the importance of the character and texture of a body of
rules, and characterizes most of the CISG's provisions, including
Article 7(1),78 as what others have referred to as "muddy standards ' 79 in
75 There is a long-standing debate about how liberal courts should be in construing the
general principles on which the CISG is based. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 146-48 for
a discussion; see also Joseph Lookofsky, Walking the Article 7(2) Tightrope Between CISG and
Domestic Law, 25 J.L. & COM. 87 (2005), Camilla Baasch Andersen, General Principles of the
CISG-Generally Impenetrable?, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 13 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds.,
2008), and Andr6 Janssen & S6rren Claas Kiene, The CISG and Its General Principles, in CISG
METHODOLOGY 261 (Andrd Janssen and Olaf Meyer, eds., 2009).
76 See CISG-AC Opinion no 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual
Merger Clause and the CISG (Oct. 23, 2004), Rapporteur: Professor Richard Hyland, Rutgers
Law School, Camden, NJ, USA.
77 Some scholars have suggested other principles of the CISG that could be used to aid in
contract interpretation. For example, Dr. Peter Schlechtriem might argue that reasonableness is a
sufficiently general principle of the CISG that it should govern contract interpretations when
Article 8(2) is unavailing. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 41. One of the problems, of course,
is that the reasonableness principle is so vague. In fact, if the application of Article 8(2) results in
an ambiguity, it may not be apparent what the reasonable interpretation of a contract terms should
be. Should it be the reasonable interpretation of the buyer or the reasonable interpretation of the
seller?
78 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 150 (Honnold does not expressly state that Article 7(1)
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contrast to "sharp-edged" rules. 80 As Honnold observes, "a code that
lays down general principles to cover a wide variety of transactions and
is expected to endure, calls for an approach very different from tax laws
and similar legislation that is written in great detail and is subject to
frequent legislative adjustment." 81  Thus, Honnold argues that the
CISG's rules and principles should be construed broadly to help achieve
the larger purpose of international legal codification and unification.
82
In fact, as Honnold and many other scholars agree,83 the risk of
construing the CISG and its principles narrowly is that this increases the
likelihood that courts will take recourse to the gap-filling provision in
Article 7(2) and use non-uniform domestic laws to resolve questions
arising under the CISG, thus undermining the entire purpose of
international legal codification and unification.
84
Article 7(1) therefore implies that if the application of Article 8
does not provide an unambiguous interpretation of a contract term,
courts should interpret the contract term in the manner that best
promotes uniformity in the application of the CISG and good faith in
international trade. Of course, this shifts the focus to addressing how
the objectives of promoting uniformity in the application of the CISG
and good faith in international trade help to choose or provide a contract
provides more of a standard than a sharp-edged rule, but he does not list it among the rules that he
describes as sharp-edged).
79 The classic article is Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577 (1988).
80 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 150.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 151-52. Of course, not everyone agrees. Indeed, one scholar has argued that the goal
of uniformity comes at the expense of other important values, and that a homeward trend bias,
which would result from construing the principles of the CISG narrowly, might improve the
legitimacy of the CISG over the long-term. See Karen Halverson Cross, Parol Evidence Under
the CISG: The "Homeward Trend" Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 138 (2007).
83 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 147; see also Michael Joachim Bonell, General Provisions:
Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES
CONVENTION 2.2.1 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell eds., 1987) ("[T]he Convention ... is intended
to replace all rules in legal systems previously governing matters within its scope .... This
means that in applying the Convention there is no valid reason to adopt a narrow interpretation."),
and Bruno Zeller, The UN Convention on Contracts Jbr the International Sale of Good- A Leap
Forward towards Unified International Sales Laws, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 79, 105-06 (2000).
Of course, not everyone agrees: see, e.g., Cross, supra note 82.
84 Of course, not everyone agrees with the goal of achieving uniformity in international sales.
For example, Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales
Law 2-4b (N.Y.U. Law & Economics Research Working Paper No. 05-02, 2005), argue that
sophisticated parties will generally prefer to draft their own customized contract terms and choose
the law that applies to their agreements, and that the CISG thus only offers a useful alternative if
the transaction costs of drafting customized contract terms are very high, but in their view, the
transaction costs are not that high.
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interpretation. Courts will no doubt advance uniformity in the
application of the CISG if and when they begin to look across national
jurisdictions for foreign precedents interpreting and applying CISG
provisions. 85  They will also help if they take seriously the scholarly
commentary on the CISG, and take full advantage of collections and
compilations of international legal materials that include the scholarly
commentary. 86 This is especially important because some authoritative
scholarly commentary has argued that reasonableness or the standards
of behavior attributable to reasonable persons is one of the general
principles upon which the CISG is based. 87 In fact, some scholars have
suggested, therefore, that there is a connection between the concept of
good faith in international trade and a reasonableness standard under the
CISG.88
F. Reasonable Commercial Standards of Fair Dealing in the Trade
The linkage between good faith in international trade and a
reasonableness requirement has further implications. As John Honnold
has argued, "[w]hat is reasonable can appropriately be determined by
ascertaining what is normal and acceptable in the relevant trade."8 9
Professor Honnold went further 90 and observed that Article 9 of the
CISG implies that, unless the parties otherwise agree, usages that are
widely known in international trade and were known or ought to have
been known by the parties are applicable to the parties' contract. 91 In
85 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 125-31 (discussing the successes and failures of courts in doing
so. Sadly, American courts have not distinguished themselves in promoting uniformity in the
application of the CISG. As Professor Honnold observes, they have often ignored foreign
precedents altogether and relied almost exclusively on case law interpreting the U.C.C.).
86 Id. at 131-33.
87 See, e.g., SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 41, at 38 (arguing that "the rule that the parties must
conduct themselves according to the standard of the "reasonable person," which is expressly
described in a number of provisions and, therefore, according to Article 7(2), must be regarded as
a general principle of the Convention.").
88 See, e.g., LOOKOFSKY, supra note 17, at 37 ("Significantly, good faith under Article 7(1)
has been linked to the pervasive Convention standard of 'reasonableness' - a CISG standard
capable of meeting a multitude of 'good faith' needs."); see also HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 136
(arguing that "Professor Schlectriem has suggested that 'good faith in international trade' should
be construed in the light of the Convention's many references to standards of reasonableness - a
standard that is so pervasive as to establish this as one of the general principles on which [the
Convention] was based."); see also SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 41, at 38.
89 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 136.
90 Id.
91 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(2) ("The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to
have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties
knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly
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fact, Professor Honnold thus suggested there is a linkage between good
faith in international trade and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade, similar to the one in the UCC,
under American law. 92 It is but a short step from there to saying that
Article 7(1), in conjunction with Article 9(2) and the reasonableness
principle of the CISG incorporated under Article 7(2), implies that when
the application of Article 8 does not result in an unambiguous contract
interpretation, the CISG should be interpreted to require the contract
interpretation that best promotes reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade.
The argument can be summarized as follows: Some highly
respected scholars and commentators have persuasively argued that a
reasonableness standard is one of the most important and pervasive
general principles of the CISG. 93 What is reasonable can usually be
ascertained by what is acceptable in the relevant trade. 94  Moreover,
Article 9 implies that, unless parties otherwise agree, usages that are
widely known in international trade and that were known or ought to
have been known by the parties are applicable to the parties' contracts.
95
The CISG therefore should be interpreted to promote good faith in
international trade and reasonable commercial conduct as determined by
what is acceptable in the relevant trade, assuming that usages widely
known in international trade are applicable to parties' contracts. This is
tantamount to a directive to interpret the CISG to promote reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. Thus, if the CISG's
express provisions do not provide an unambiguous interpretation of a
contract term, the general principles of the CISG require the
interpretation that best promotes reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade.
To be clear, this is not an argument that the CISG imposes a good
faith obligation on the individual parties. The predominant weight of
scholarly opinion is that the CISG does not impose a duty of good faith
on the individual parties to a CISG contract. 96 That is not the same as
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.").
92 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 136 ("A similar linkage among 'good faith,' reasonableness
and trade usage is found in U.C.C. 2-103(l)(b) . .
93 SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 41, at 38.
94 HONNOLD, supra note 5, at 136.
95 Id.
96 But for an argument to the contrary, see Troy Keily, Good Faith and the Vienna
Convention on Contracts fbr the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3 VINDOBONA J. OF INT'L
COM. L. & ARB. 15, 24-25 (1999). Professor Kelly makes a persuasive argument that the CISG
should impose a general good faith requirement on the parties: "The CISG outlines rights and
obligations of parties to an international sale of goods. Article 7(1) provides that the principle of
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the argument here. The argument here is that the directive in Article
7(1) to interpret the CISG to promote good faith in international trade
implies that when Article 8, in conjunction with the CISG's other
express provisions governing contract interpretation, does not provide a
clear, unambiguous answer to a question about the interpretation of a
contract term, the CISG requires that courts should interpret the contract
term in the way that best promotes reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade.
Reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade are
usually required in some form under the laws of most commercially
developed nations.97 When the express provisions of Article 8 do not
provide a clear unambiguous answer to an interpretive problem,
interpreting the CISG to require the contract interpretation that best
promotes reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade
would thus result in contract interpretations that are coherent with the
history and traditions of commercial law. Most important of all, it
would create the potential for courts to develop a coherent body of
international law governing the interpretation of CISG contracts' terms.
Even if the jurisprudence failed to achieve its full potential, the outcome
would be much better than if courts turned to domestic laws to resolve
interpretive conundrums.
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay has argued that all questions about contract
interpretation under contracts governed by the CISG should be
answered by the CISG's express provisions or by the CISG's general
principles. The CISG thus should have a broad preclusive effect on
domestic legal rules of contract interpretation. The CISG's express
rules governing contract interpretations have some important
implications. First of all, the CISG has no statute of frauds, and there
are no restrictions on how extrinsic evidence may be brought to bear on
contract interpretations. Second, the CISG has no parol evidence rule,
and so oral evidence as well as evidence about what under United States
good faith should be used when interpreting these provisions. Surely it is not possible to interpret
the CISG in good faith without also indirectly affecting the conduct of parties."
97 Reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade provide an important base line
for commercial conduct under the UCC, the commercial laws of most common law nations, the
Principles of European Contract Law, and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts. See Mary E. Hiscock, The Keeper of the Flame: Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
International Trade, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1059 (1996), for an overview of the standard's
pervasiveness.
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law are called courses of dealing, courses of performance, and usages of
trade, may all be brought to bear on the interpretation of a CISG
contract. Moreover, the CISG does not specify any hierarchy of
authority between the different kinds of evidence that can be used in
contract interpretation. In principle, written and oral evidence as well as
courses of dealing, courses of performance, and usages of trade all carry
the same weight.
The CISG's most important rules governing contract interpretation
are in Article 8. Article 8(1) of the CISG states that statements made by
a party are to be determined by the party's subject intent where the other
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
Unfortunately, Article 8(1) will rarely apply since there will rarely be
evidence that is not only sufficient to prove a party's subjective intent
but is also sufficient to prove that the other party knew or could not
have been unaware of that subjective intent. Article 8(2) will therefore
more commonly apply. Article 8(2) states that, statements made by a
party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in
the same circumstances. When there is no extrinsic evidence and one of
the parties drafted a written memorial of the agreement, the application
of Article 8(2) will often be redolent of the principle of contra
proferentum. But it may also result in ambiguity since a reasonable
person of the same kind as the other party could have interpreted a
party's statements or conduct in more than one way even under the
same circumstances.
When the parties have jointly executed a written memorial of their
agreement the application of Article 8(2) may be even more
complicated. In cases where a written memorial (and/or other
admissible evidence) is jointly executed, Article 8(2) appears to require
a court to contemplate relative to each of the parties how a reasonable
person of the same kind as the other party and under the same
circumstances would have understood their statements. It is possible
that, relative to each of the parties, a reasonable person in the position of
the other party under the same circumstances could have more than one
- perhaps even several - reasonable interpretations of their statements.
In other words, relative to each of the party's, Article 8(2) might imply
a set of multiple reasonable interpretations that could be imputed to the
other party. Article 8(2) implies that the correct interpretation of the
contract term should be one that is mutually reasonable. There are
actually three possibilities. The intersection of the sets of reasonable
interpretations defined under Article 8(2) could (1) identify a unique
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mutually reasonable interpretation, (2) identify a set of more than one
mutually reasonable interpretations, or it (3) might not identify any
mutually reasonable interpretations of the term. If the application of
Article 8(2) resulted in multiple reasonable interpretations or no
mutually reasonable interpretations the contract term would remain
ambiguous.
The application of Article 8(2) may, therefore, result in
ambiguities. The important question is how the ambiguities should be
resolved. There are two ways in which courts might resolve the
ambiguities inappropriately. One possibility is that courts might treat
the conundrum as one that raises a question about the validity of the
contract term (or even the contract itself) rather than its interpretation.
In that case, the CISG would not apply and courts would be obliged to
apply a domestic legal rule governing the validity of the contract term to
answer the question. Another possibility is that courts might deduce
that because the express provisions of the CISG do not resolve the.1
interpretive ambiguity, there is a gap in the CISG and they must apply
private choice of law rules to identify the domestic legal rules that
should be used to answer the question. If courts took either of these"
approaches, they would undermine the intent and purpose of the CISG.
Since the CISG governs questions about contract interpretation, courts
should find ways to resolve contract interpretation problems using the
CISG. If they do not, non-uniform domestic laws will creep their way
into international sales cases.
Article 7(1) provides some appropriate guidance. Article 7(1)
directs courts to interpret the CISG with regard to its international
character and the need to promote uniformity in its application and good
faith in international trade. This is important because there is a linkage
between good faith in international trade and some of the most general
principles upon which the CISG is based. One of those principles is a
reasonableness requirement. What is reasonable can usually be
ascertained by what is acceptable in the relevant trade. Moreover,
Article 9 implies that, unless parties otherwise agree, usages that are
widely known in international trade and that were known or ought to
have been known by the parties are applicable to the parties' contracts.
The CISG therefore should be interpreted to promote good faith in
international trade and reasonable commercial conduct as determined by
what is acceptable in the relevant trade, assuming that usages widely
known in international trade are applicable to parties' contracts. This is
tantamount to a directive to interpret the CISG's provisions to promote
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. Thus,
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when the application of the express rule in Article 8(2) provides an
ambiguous interpretation of a contract term, the CISG should be
interpreted to require that courts provide the contract interpretation that
best promotes reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade.
This is not an argument that the CISG imposes a good faith
obligation on the individual parties to a contract. It is an argument that
when the express rule in Article 8(2) does not provide a clear,
unambiguous answer to a question about the interpretation of a contract
term, the general principles of the CISG imply that the contract term
should be interpreted in the way that best promotes reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. This should result in
contract interpretations that are coherent with the history and traditions
of commercial law. Most important of all, it should help to further the
intent and purpose of international sales law codification as well as the
coherence of international sales jurisprudence. Even if international
sales jurisprudence fails to achieve its full potential, the outcome will be
much better than if courts turn to domestic laws to resolve interpretive
conundrums under CISG contracts.
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